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local empowerment, policy planning, and implemen-
tation is absent. It is doubtful that these bodies will 
be targeted by militants for extortion, as that would 
alienate the very people whose support or at least 
silence is necessary for militancy to thrive. The lack 
of use of local popular bodies to create rural infra-
structure instead of private contractors chosen in a 
centralized manner through dubious means does little 
to reduce popular alienation or re-create infrastruc-
ture. What it leads to is a skewed income and asset 
distribution apart from enriching the militants. Simi-
larly, steps taken in the direction of entrepreneurship 
training among local residents so as to enable them 
to set up enterprises on their own is a more sustain-
able model than setting up state-owned enterprises. 
These activities, especially in the areas of adding value 
to horticultural produce, can do much to generate 
incomes and employment. Making them targets of 
extortion by militants may not be accompanied by 
the same social sanction as in the case of extortion of 
government contractors. 
So far, neither the state government nor the 
central government has moved in this direction, 
although most recently the central government has 
prodded the state government in the direction of 
democratic decentralization. This clearly is an oppor-
tunity lost, as the goal of economic development 
need not be given up even when an insurgency is on. 
But in a milieu where years of “easy money” accentu-
ated by “security concerns” create an impressive 
array of vested interests bolstered by casualty graphs 
that point downwards accompanied by surprisingly 
steady numbers of militants waiting to infiltrate into 
India, resources keep on flowing in the same manner 
and volume as previously. In such circumstances, 
policy shifts—especially radical ones—are the first 
casualties. 
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Water, Wars, and Kashmir
Conflicts over water—a precious resource, the 
supply of which is growing sparser and the demand 
for which is ever mounting—have been much talked 
about by experts. Growing populations and extending 
development would render conflicts between water-
rich and water-scarce nations inevitable. Upstream 
states that control the flow of water to downstream 
states would use this valuable resource as a key dip-
lomatic and strategic tool to coerce the downstream 
nations into submitting to its demands. According to 
the 2002 United Nations World Water Development 
Report, there were 507 conflictive events over water 
during the previous fifty years. Thirty-seven among 
these involved violence, of which 21 consisted of 
military acts (18 between Israel and its neighbors). 
“Some of the most vociferous enemies around the 
world have negotiated water agreements [concerning 
international rivers] or are in the process of doing 
so,” says the report. Global warming would act as a 
catalyst to water-conflict scenarios, with decreasing 
rainfall and increasing evaporation in some areas 
that have made the regular climate patterns erratic. 
Intermittent phases of flooding and droughts causing 
massive human suffering would pressure governments 
into turning off the taps to its neighbors.
The Indus River, whose basin cradled one of the 
oldest civilizations of the world, sustains Pakistan 
today. Both India and Pakistan depend on snow-fed 
rivers that rise in the himalayas. Pakistan depends on 
the Indus for its survival and sustenance. The Indus, 
moreover, passes through Jammu and Kashmir, which 
is in dispute between the two countries. The history 
of water sharing between India and Pakistan has been 
marked by exceptional cooperation and intermittent 
conflicts over the interpretation of the water sharing 
treaty that forms the basis for this cooperation. The 
Tulbul Navigation Project and the Baglihar, Kishan-
ganga, and Salal hydroelectric power projects are a 
few contentious issues between the two countries 
revolving around the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The 
incongruities in interpretations of the IWT have been 
attributed to political motives, rather than differ-
ences over technical and engineering aspects of water 
management.
The Indus Waters Treaty: Emergence of an 
Effective Conflict Management Tool 
The IWT brokered by the World Bank (WB) 
provided for the division of the rivers between 
India and Pakistan. The eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas 
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and Ravi—were allocated to India. The western 
rivers—Jhelum, Chenab and Indus—were allotted to 
Pakistan (barring their use by India under specified 
conditions in Jammu and Kashmir), with limited 
consumptive rights over these to India. how did the 
IWT come into being?
In April 1948, the lack of a water-sharing agree-
ment led India to curtail the flow of west flowing 
tributaries to Pakistan. This brought to the fore the 
imperative of negotiations for an equitable distribu-
tion of the Indus River and its tributaries between 
the two riparian states, and for developing a coherent 
plan for integrated development of the water basin. 
The hurried partition of the Indian subcontinent 
through the India Independence Act by British 
Parliament in 1947, under the duress of increasing 
communal violence, resulted in the creation of two 
new independent states, India and Pakistan. The two 
countries, however, were beleaguered by problems 
related to delineation of their international boundar-
ies; accession of a number of princely states, especially 
that of Jammu and Kashmir; as well as the deci-
sions about their complex river systems, the Indus 
(shared by India with West Pakistan) and Ganges and 
Brahmaputra (shared by India with East Pakistan). 
Of these three rivers, the Indus basin—typified by 
thousands of kilometers of man-made irrigation 
canals and headworks that regulated the flow of its 
waters—proved to be the most complicated. What 
exacerbated the problem was the fact that the Indus 
originated from the disputed territory of Jammu and 
Kashmir, the legal status of which both countries 
became involved in war soon after independence 
in 1947. however, the waters irrigated most of the 
fertile lands of Punjab, divided into East and West 
Punjab. 
The existing water turn systems were frozen by a 
“Standstill Agreement” in December 1947 at the two 
headworks of Madhopur (on the Ravi) and Ferozepur 
(on the Sutlej) until March 31, 1948. Upon expiry of 
this agreement on April 1, 1948 and in the absence of 
a new agreement, India discontinued the delivery of 
water to the Dipalpur Canal and the main branches 
of the Upper Bari Daab Canal from these headworks. 
The Arbitral Tribunal (AT) that was set up by the 
Indian Independence Act to look into differences 
over matters of division of assets between the two 
countries also expired on the same day. 
In April 1948, the Engineers of the two divided 
Punjab States met in Simla and signed two Stand-
still Agreements regarding continuous flow from 
two other canals, Depalpur and Central Bari, until 
October 1948. As per this agreement the West 
Punjab provincial government would pay seignior-
age charges and proportionate maintenance costs, 
and interest on a proportionate amount of capital. 
In July 1950, Pakistan stopped seigniorage payments 
to India, which continued to supply water as per the 
agreement. Due to ongoing hostilities between the 
two neighbors on account of Kashmir, no further 
talks were held.
David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority and a former Chairman of 
Atomic Energy Commission, USA visited the two 
countries in 1951 and proposed that India and 
Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and 
operate the Indus Basin river system. Inspired by this 
idea, Eugene R. Black, then President of the World 
Bank, visited the two countries and proposed a 
Working Party of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank 
engineers to tackle the functional aspects of water 
sharing. The two countries accepted this mediation 
and the World Bank stepped in with its own draft 
proposals for resolution in February 1954, distribut-
ing the three Eastern Rivers to India and the three 
Western rivers to Pakistan. Protracted talks were 
held amid mounting tensions, and finally the Indus 
Waters Treaty was signed by Jawaharlal Nehru, then 
Prime Minister of India; Field Marshal Ayub Khan, 
then President of Pakistan; and W.A.B. Illif, then 
President of the World Bank, in Karachi in Septem-
ber 1960. 
The IWT provided for one of the most compre-
hensive dispute resolution mechanisms. Under the 
IWT, India can undertake projects on the western 
rivers for general conservation, flood control, irriga-
tion and hydropower generation, and duly inform 
Pakistan of the same. Pakistan’s objection would 
render it a matter of dispute to be settled either by 
negotiations or by a neutral expert, or by arbitration. 
Three members, one from India, one from Pakistan 
and the third member by mutual agreement or an 
International Court of Justice appointee in lieu 
would be the arbitrators. Any unresolved “question” 
between the two parties through the Permanent 
Indus Commission becomes a “difference” to be 
referred to a neutral expert, who is appointed by the 
two countries, and failing that, the World Bank. If 
the neutral expert’s recommendations are unaccept-
able to either of the parties, the matter would be 
treated as a “dispute” and it would be referred to a 
Court of Arbitration established by the World Bank, 
along with other institutions such as the secretary 
general of the United Nations.
Water Conflict: Key Issues of Contention
Water sharing between the two neighbors has been 
characterized by intermittent conflict and long 
sustained cooperation. however, recent issues have 
brought the sustainability of the IWT under serious 
scrutiny. Twenty-seven projects undertaken by India 
in the Indus basin in Jammu and Kashmir have been 
questioned by Pakistan. This has resulted in delays in 
implementation, prohibitive increases in costs, and 
stalling of development in J&K. Three of the most 
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contentious issues—the Baglihar hydel Power Project 
(BhP), Tulbul Navigation Project (TNP), and Kish-
enganga Project—are discussed below. 
Baglihar • The 900 megawatt (MW) BhP on the 
Chenab River in Doda district in Jammu stands out 
as a key issue between India and Pakistan. It was also 
the first ever to be referred for international arbitra-
tion through the dispute resolution mechanism under 
Article IX of the IWT. Pakistan feared that the BhP 
would divert considerable downstream flows and 
could also be used to cause floods in the riparian 
areas.
Similar objections were raised by Pakistan over 
Salal, a 480 MW hydropower project on the Chenab 
in 1978, that storage could be used for drying up 
flows as well as for flooding the lower riparian states. 
however, any attempt to flood Pakistan would inun-
date the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) 
first. Such action would also run counter to the rules 
of war and against the Geneva Conventions, inviting 
international condemnation. It is highly unlikely, 
therefore, that India would indulge in such an act 
and such fears are thus unfounded. India’s agreement 
to make design changes in the Salal dam has resulted 
in severe siltage problems and India was wary of a 
repetition of the same.
In response to Pakistan’s objections over the 
BhP, India contended that as it was a run of the 
river project, the water utilized for power genera-
tion would be released back into the river stream 
and therefore there would be no difference in the 
quantum of water release. Both India and Pakistan 
tried to resolve the issue through bilateral talks. 
Pakistan’s demand to shelve construction work until 
the issue gets resolved was not heeded by India, as the 
latter did not want a repetition of the TNP, which 
has been shelved since 1987. Since no breakthrough 
was achieved, Pakistan sought arbitration of a neutral 
expert under the ambit of the IWT to look into the 
matter. The report by the neutral expert, Raymond 
Laffitte, vindicated the Indian position that the BhP 
was not in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. 
Design changes, including reductions in freeboard 
and pondage and increase in the height of the power 
intakes, were recommended. The neutral expert over-
ruled Pakistan’s objections over the use of gated spill-
ways, as it is one of the most important techniques to 
handle the problem of sedimentation. The verdict on 
the BhP case will hopefully establish momentum for 
building such projects in the conflict-ridden state, to 
augment developmental work there.
Tulbul • The Tulbul navigation project, called Wullar 
barrage in Pakistan, is part of the composite dialogue 
within the framework of the peace process under-
way between India and Pakistan (unlike the BhP, 
which was referred for international arbitration). 
The TNP originally envisaged the construction of a 
439-feet long and 40-feet wide barrage by India in 
1984 on the River Jhelum, at the mouth of Wullar 
Lake, near Sopore in Kashmir. With a maximum 
storage capacity of 0.30 million acre feet (MAF), it 
was intended to maximize the utilization of water at 
India’s largest fresh water lake, making the Jhelum 
navigable by regulating water storage in the Wullar 
through enhancing currents in the Jhelum during the 
lean months from November to February. Pakistan 
claims the TNP is in violation of the IWT, believing 
it could be used by India to control the river’s flow as 
a geo-strategic weapon. 
The Indian stance is that the purpose of the 
barrage is to make the river navigable in summer and 
not to affect the outflows into Pakistan. The barrage, 
according to Pakistan, would impede flows into their 
Upper Chenab Canal and the Lower Bari Doab 
Canals. The case was referred to the Indus Waters 
Commission in 1986, but failed to be resolved. 
Before Pakistan could move to the International 
Arbitral Court, India stopped construction and the 
project has been shelved ever since 1987. 
The most recent talks in August 2007 in the 
fourth round of composite dialogue ended incon-
clusively. In 1991, a draft agreement was prepared, 
which allowed the construction of the barrage with 
certain technical stipulations—such as leaving 6.2 
meters of barrage ungated, reducing general storage 
capacity by 30,000 acre feet—with due monitoring 
by the Indus Water Commissioners. however, the 
draft agreement was not signed, since Pakistan linked 
its resolution to the 390 MW Kishenganga hydro-
electric project, another unresolved issue between the 
countries, and demanded that India should forego its 
construction. The 1991 draft could be used as a basis 
for resolution as it asserted that the issue would be 
resolved within the scope of the IWT. Each conten-
tious issue has to be resolved separately for giving 
resolution a real chance. The tremendous potential of 
waterways in J&K needs to be utilized and reaching a 
consensus over such projects is imperative. 
Kishenganga • The Kishenganga Project entails a 75 
meter high concrete dam at Gurez at about 8,000 feet 
to store 140,000 MAF of water and divert some flows 
through a 22 km tunnel bored into the mountain 
into the Madmati Nala, which empties into the 
Wullar Lake. Kishenganga, called Neelum on the 
other side of the LoC, is a tributary that flows into 
the Jhelum near Nowshera (close to Muzaffarabad). 
Inter-tributary transfer is allowed under the IWT. 
Pakistan’s objection is that the water is not transferred 
into the same tributary Neelum, although it finally 
gets into the Jhelum. It also fears that the project 
would flush the Wullar Lake. India informed Pakistan 
about the project in 1994, while Pakistan contends 
that the construction of a dam on the Neelum near 
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Nowshera had been underway for irrigation pur-
poses and that 133,000 hectares was already being 
irrigated at that time. Pakistan’s Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) does not show 
this as one of its projects, and there is no evidence to 
substantiate this claim. According to India, the work 
on the Kishenganga Project commenced well before 
the Neelum project, while Pakistan insists to the 
contrary. Determination of the “existing use” of water 
that will get affected and the date that is to be taken 
into account for the same are the major issues of the 
dispute, among others. 
Areas for Cooperation: Revising 
the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus is the lifeline of Pakistan and water sharing 
is therefore a very emotive issue in Pakistan as well 
as in Kashmir. The Kashmiris, however, feel that the 
IWT is unfair to them, as India relinquished con-
sumptive rights over the west flowing rivers, which 
pass through the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K). To meet the energy requirements of the state, 
harnessing these rivers is essential. The benefits that 
would have accrued to the state were surrendered 
by the Indian government without due consultation 
with the local government. Several power projects 
in the state have been held up due to disputes with 
Pakistan over the IWT. having a hydroelectric power 
potential of over 20,000 MW, J&K is in need of 
the critical infrastructure to harness its abundant 
resources. So far, hardly 1,500 MW of this potential 
has been exploited, both under state and Indian 
Central Government schemes. Against its require-
ment of over 1,600 MW, the state generates only 
about 450 MW. The state has an annual expenditure 
of Rs 2000 crore (approximately $500 million) on 
purchasing power from outside to meet its demands. 
The ongoing peace process in Kashmir needs to be 
complemented by an augmented pace of develop-
ment. Addressing the current power situation holds 
the key to the development question in the region 
and would provide enormous employment oppor-
tunities. Speedy resolution of the pending disputes 
is vital and the IWT, which has been honored even 
during wartime, needs to be the basis for resolution. 
Article VII of the IWT envisages future coop-
eration, pointing to the “common interest in the 
optimum development of the rivers” and calling 
upon both sides “to cooperate, by mutual consent, 
to the fullest extent in undertaking engineering 
works in the rivers.” Both India and Pakistan are also 
poor managers of water and have an inter-provincial 
problem of water sharing. Joint mechanisms under 
the IWT for harnessing and management of water 
should be part of the portfolio of confidence building 
measures between the two countries. The IWT-2 
that is discussed in some policy circles would be a 
take off from the IWT, which is instructive on the 
purposes of cooperation and dispute resolution and 
also provides ample scope for revision. With climate 
change threatening to impact rainfall patterns and 
water supply, both India and Pakistan need to think 
seriously of such a joint mechanism. Achieving the 
goals of more storage structures and better distribu-
tion channels requires joint deliberation. Laffitte 
stressed the use of modern technology in the BhP 
report, and cooperation on such technology for better 
water management would be extremely pertinent. 
It would significantly help in integrating the region 
economically. Political determination on both sides is 
absolutely necessary to make resolution and initia-
tion of such joint management of the Indus basin 
possible. Politicizing this emotive issue of water, 
as has occurred in the past, cannot be allowed to 
overshadow the process of such emerging coopera-
tion. Solutions to water sharing issues are vital for the 
development of Jammu and Kashmir, and coopera-
tion would represent a significant confidence building 
measure that would favorably impact the livelihoods 
of millions of people on both sides of the LoC.
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